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NOTES
Antitrust and Baseball-
A League of Their Own
INTRODUCTION
In its purest form, baseball symbolizes American progressivism.
As our national pastime, baseball embodies the competitive spirit
that propelled industrialization, technological advancement, and the
overall growth of the United States into the world's predominant
economic power.1 For over a century, the game of baseball has
entertained Americans and provided them with an athletic art form
which they can appreciate and discuss, much like the theater. Act-
ing in accordance with this perception of the game, the United
States Supreme Court granted Major League Baseball ("Baseball")
an exemption from federal antitrust laws in 1922 based on a find-
ing that the business of baseball does not implicate interstate com-
merce.2 No other professional sports league enjoys a comparable
privilege, and despite perennial challenges to its validity, Baseball's
exemption has remained virtually unscathed.
With America's economic evolution over the past seventy-one
years, however, some contend that the business of Baseball has
transformed the game into an industry which appears more con-
cerned with finance than amusement. These critics deem the anti-
trust exemption "anachronistic, upholding a privileged status for a
1. One baseball historian notes that baseball was "the only well-established team
sport when industrialism took hold," suggesting an intrinsic correlation between the
development of organized baseball and technological advancement. See EUGENE C.
MURDOCK, BAN JOHNSON: CZAR OF BASEBALL 3-4 (1982).
2. See Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Al-
though the Supreme Court has since held that Baseball's business falls within interstate
commerce, the Court has preserved the exemption, ruling that a change in the law must
issue from Congress and not from the judiciary. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282,
284-85 (1972).
564 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
single, small group of wealthy sportsmen."3 In December 1992, the
antitrust exemption was the subject of a Senate subcommittee hear-
ing where numerous legislators, team owners, and academics
voiced their concerns and suggestions regarding the future of Base-
ball's seemingly indelible exemption.4  Several senators subse-
quently introduced the Professional Baseball Reform Act of 19935
("Reform Act"), providing that "the business of professional Base-
ball is in, or affects, interstate commerce."6 Ratification of this
legislation would essentially dissolve Baseball's privileged status,
which is predicated on the premise that the business of Baseball
does not implicate interstate commerce
Moreover, a federal judge in Pennsylvania recently held that
Baseball's antitrust exemption is limited to Baseball's "reserve
system," an obsolete method which was once employed by Base-
ball teams to restrict player movement The decision, Piazza v.
3. Robert G. Berger, After the Strikes: A Reexamination of Professional Base-
ball's Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 45 U. PITr. L. REV. 209 (1983).
4. Hearing on "Baseball's Antitrust Immunity" Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. § 1 (1992). See also Dave Anderson, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at Dl.
Among those who testified at the hearing against the exemption were: Sen.
Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), who chairs the Senate Judiciary Committee's Anti-
trust, Monopolies and Business Rights Subcommittee; Sen. Paul Simon (D-I11.); Don-
ald M. Fehr, Executive Director of the Major League Baseball Players Association;
Rodric Harrison, a former major and minor league pitcher; Sen. Connie Mack, 1H (R-
Fla.); Rep. Michael Bilirakis (R-Fla.); Rick Dodge, Assistant City Manager of St. Pe-
tersburg, Fla.; Gene Kimmelman, Legislative Director of the Consumer Federation of
America; Andrew Zimbalist, Robert A. Woods Professor of Economics at Smith Col-
lege; and Roger G. Noll, Professor of Economics at Stanford University. Persons who
testified in the exemption's favor included: former Baseball Commissioner Fay Vin-
cent; acting Baseball Commissioner Andrew H. "Bud" Selig, owner of the Milwaukee
Brewers; Gary R. Roberts, Vice Dean and Professor of Tulane Law School; and San
Francisco Mayor Frank M. Jordan. Senate Committee Takes Swings at Baseball's An-
titrust Exemption, 63 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 743 (Dec. 17, 1992).
5. S. 500, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
6. Id. § 2(1).
7. Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 205-09; see infra text accompanying notes 85-
92.
8. See infra note 78.
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Major League Baseball,9 represents perhaps the most formidable
challenge to Baseball's exemption in recent years. In fact, legisla-
tors in support of the bill to repeal the exemption believe the legis-
lation now carries more weight in light of the Piazza decision.1°
According to Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), who helped
draft the bill to repeal the exemption, the decision "underscores the
need for legislation that will make it clear that Major League Base-
ball must play by the same rules as every other professional
sport.,1
1
Detractors of Baseball's antitrust exemption fail to realize that
the exemption no longer provides Baseball with a competitive ad-
vantage over other professional sports leagues. With respect to
broadcasting rights, a major source of revenue for professional
sports franchises, all professional sports leagues are currently ex-
empt statutorily from antitrust regulation. 12 Furthermore, since the
dissolution of the reserve clause, which Baseball teams utilized to
control player movement, the antitrust exemption no longer affords
Baseball the ability to restrict player salaries with greater ease than
the rest of the professional sports leagues. 3
Presently, Baseball's exemption allows it to regulate franchise
relocation and consequently, to prevent teams from wasting taxpay-
er dollars used to construct stadiums which have virtually no other
use than to house baseball teams. In addition, the exemption en-
ables Baseball to subsidize minor league franchises which other-
wise might not survive without financial assistance. Thus, passage
of legislation such as the Reform Act would only harm the sport's
consumers by dissolving the important benefits of the exemption.
Part I of this Note briefly overviews the creation and goals of
federal antitrust law and focuses on whether the business of Base-
ball would violate the Sherman Antitrust Act were the exemption
lifted by legislative reform. Part II traces the history of Baseball's
antitrust exemption since its inception in the 1920s and discusses
9. No. 92-7173, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10552 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1993).
10. Paul Barton, Senator Seeks Help for Antitrust Fight, USA TODAY, Aug. 10,
1993, at 4C.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court's unwillingness to dissolve the exemption de-
spite its subsequent finding that the business of Baseball implicates
interstate commerce. Part III analyzes the Piazza decision and
criticizes its narrow interpretation of Baseball's exemption. Part IV
distinguishes Baseball from other professional sports leagues that
are subject to the antitrust laws and argues that the current status
of Baseball mandates preserving the exemption. In conclusion, this
Note recommends that Congress not enact legislation that would
terminate this exemption and suggests that courts attempting to
apply antitrust law to Baseball adopt an expansive view of the
exemption.
I. SECTIONS 1 & 2 OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT CAN'T
CATCH BASEBALL
A. Background
Antitrust legislation in the United States arose in response to
the growing concentration of economic power in the hands of a
relatively small portion of the population at the end of the nine-
teenth century.14 During this era, a limited number of individuals
and corporations accumulated substantial wealth, and "trmsts,"
which were believed to threaten competition, control prices and
stifle individual initiative, were gradually developing. 5 In response
14. For a detailed analysis of the historical context giving rise to federal antitrust
legislation, see Andrew I. Cavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Function of Anti-
trust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 657, 683-95 (1993); James May, Antitrust in
the Formative Era: Political & Economic Theory in Constitutional Antitrust Analysis,
50 OHio ST. L.J. 257, 288-98 (1989).
15. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). In Standard Oil,
the Court noted that:
The debates... conclusively show.., that the main cause which led to the
legislation was the thought that it was required by the economic condition of
the times, that is, the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of corpora-
tions and individuals, the enormous development of corporate organization,
the facility for combination which such organizations afforded, the fact that
the facility was being used, and that combinations known as trusts were be-
ing multiplied, and the widespread impression that their power had been and
would be exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public generally.
Id. at 50.
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to these phenomena, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act16
("Sherman Act") in an attempt to prevent further concentration of
power and preserve competition among sellers. The statute was
intended to prevent or suppress devices or practices which create
monopolies or restrain trade or commerce by suppressing or re-
stricting competition and impeding the course of trade. 7
Generally, claims brought under the Sherman Act allege a vio-
lation of either section 1 or section 2. Section 1 provides that
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.""8 Section
2 states that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person or per-
sons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony." 19
B. The Business of Baseball Does Not Unreasonably Restrain
Trade in Violation of Section 1
Since "the cooperation of teams off the playing field is neces-
sary to effective and meaningful competition on the playing field,"
professional sports present particular problems for the application
of section 1 criteria.20 Thus, courts have attempted to apply these
principles in a manner that insures competition while respecting the
collective nature of professional athletics. 2' Based on the language
of the Sherman Act, a claimant seeking relief under section 1 must
satisfy a three-prong analysis: (1) whether the practice is in or
affects interstate commerce; (2) whether the practice is a collabora-
16. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
20. WiLL AM R. ANDERSON & C. PAUL ROGERS, I, ANTrrRUST LAW: POuCY
AND PRACrICE 910 (1992).
21. Id. For further analysis of the applicability of section 1 to professional sports
leagues, see Myron L. Dale & John Hunt, Antitrust Law & Baseball Franchises:
Leaving Your Heart (And the Giants) in San Francisco, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 337, 342-
50 (1993).
568 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
tive effort; and (3) whether the practice unreasonably restrains
trade.22
1. Interstate Commerce
In view of the fact that Baseball's exemption is predicated on
the premise that its activities are local and do not implicate inter-
state commerce, 23 the first factor requiring analysis under section
1 is whether this understanding of the business of Baseball is still
accurate. Since the inception of Baseball's antitrust exemption in
1922,24 numerous decisions have held that professional sports
leagues other than Baseball involve interstate commerce. 25 In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court in Flood v. Kuhn,26 while preserving Base-
ball's exemption, held that the League's business falls within inter-
state commerce.27 Furthermore, the Reform Act proposed in Con-
gress to repeal the exemption is specifically worded to describe the
activities of Major League Baseball as in or affecting interstate
commerce. 28 Thus, were Baseball to lose its exempt status, the
League's business activities would satisfy the interstate commerce
prong of section 1.
2. Collective Action
The second prong of the section 1 analysis requires resolving
whether independently owned sports franchises can contract, com-
bine, or conspire in violation of section 1. If a league constitutes
a "single entity" pursuing a single purpose, then section 1 does not
apply to it.29 If, however, a league consists of independent entities,
22. See, e.g., Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993); Haagen-Dazs Co. v. Double Rainbow Gourmet Ice Creams,
Inc., 895 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990); Hahn v. Oregon Physician's Serv., 860 F.2d 1501
(9th Cir. 1988).
23. See Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959)
(boxing); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (football);
Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 846 (1966) (golf); Levin v. National Basketball Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149, 152
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (basketball); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia
Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 504 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey).
26. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
27. Id. at 282.
28. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
29. Section 1 of the Sherman Act reaches unreasonable restraints of trade effected
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each pursuing diverse yet competing purposes, section 1 prohibits
collective action by such independent entities which unreasonably
restrain trade. 0
Since federal antitrust laws currently do not apply to Baseball,
no court has addressed whether or not Baseball constitutes a single
entity for section 1 purposes. In order to ascertain whether section
1 would apply to Baseball were it to lose its exemption, it is in-
structive to look at decisions addressing this issue concerning foot-
ball.
Perhaps the most prominent football decision confronting the
single entity question is Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commis-
sion v. National Football League ("Raiders").31  In Raiders, the
owner of the then Oakland Raiders sought to move his franchise to
the Los Angeles Coliseum.32  Pursuant to the National Football
League's ("NFL") constitution, which requires majority approval
by a "contract, combination or conspiracy" between separate entities and not conduct
that is "wholly unilateral." Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752, 767-68 (1984); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). In Copperweld
the Court explained:
The reason Congress treat[s] concerted behavior more strictly than unilateral
behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted activity is fraught with anti-com-
petitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of deci-
sion making that competition assumes and demands. In any conspiracy, two
or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately are
combining to act as one for their common benefit. This not only reduces the
diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases
the economic power moving in one particular direction. Of course, such
mergings of resources may well lead to efficiencies that benefit consumers,
but their anti-competitive potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny even in
the absence of incipient monopoly.
467 U.S. at 768-69.
30. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984). In NCAA, the NCAA was charged with unreasonably restraining trade with
respect to televising college football games. The Supreme Court held that the
NCAA's restrictions on price and output constituted unlawful restraints of trade, im-
plicitly recognizing that competing sports league teams can constitute independent
entities and are capable of collective action in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Id.
31. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), ce'rt. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
32. 726 F.2d at 1384.
1993]
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of any relocation, the other owners vetoed the move.3 3 Conse-
quently, the Raiders and the Los Angeles Coliseum sued the NFL
claiming it impermissibly conspired to restrain trade in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.Y As its line of defense, the NFL
contended it was a single-entity and therefore could not conspire
to restrain trade.3 ' The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that the NFL
was not a joint venture but a combination of separate business
entities, each selling a product with a value independent of the
products of others.3
Conversely, the Third Circuit reached a different conclusion
when applying section 1 combination and conspiracy principles to
the thwarted attempt of a franchise to join the NFL. In Mid-South
Grizzlies v. National Football League,37 the Mid-South Grizzlies,
a franchise in the defunct World Football League ("WFL"), applied
for admission to the NFL.38 The NFL denied the Grizzlies admis-
sion and the team subsequently brought suit alleging, inter alia,
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.39 The NFL defended
on the grounds that it was a single entity and thus not subject to
section 1 scrutiny.'
In ruling for the NFL, the Mid-South Grizzlies court stressed
the necessity of collective action among NFL franchises in deter-
mining the site of a new franchise.41 The court noted that catego-
rizing the NFL as a single-entity was appropriate in this particular
instance-i.e., where the team seeking admission did not threaten
to compete with existing franchises.42 In a situation where a fran-
33. Id. at 1385.
34. Id. at 1389.
35. Id. at 1387.
36. Id. at 1387-90.
37. 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
38. 720 F.2d at 775-76.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 787.
41. Id.
42. Id. Since the Mid-South Grizzlies were located in Memphis, Tennessee, more
than 200 miles away from the nearest NFL franchise in St. Louis, Missouri, the court
determined that the NFL was not restraining competition by denying the Grizzlies
admission. Id.
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chise was attempting to join the League in an area already served
by an existing franchise, however, the court conceded that viewing
the NFL as a single-entity would be inappropriate.' 3
As applied to Baseball, it is possible to reconcile the differing
opinions in Raiders and Mid-South Grizzlies as a function of their
factual circumstances-i.e., intra-league competition versus inter-
league competition-suggesting that were Baseball to lose its ex-
emption, it would qualify as a single-entity in some circumstances
but not in others. Nevertheless, with respect to Baseball, some
economists contend that "section 1 anticonspiracy principles [are]
ill suited for reviewing the internal decisions of an inherently joint
venture partnership."44 This is particularly true in light of Base-
ball's protracted playing season. Major League Baseball franchises
play more than ten times as many games as professional football.
Therefore, greater cooperation among Baseball teams off the play-
ing field is necessary for effective competition on the playing field.
As a result, the possibility exists that courts applying antitrust laws
to Baseball would not find decisions rendered in the football con-
text instructive due to the marked difference in structure between
the two sports.
3. Unreasonable Restraints
Even if Baseball were to qualify as a group of independent
entities engaged in interstate commerce under the first two prongs
of section 1, Baseball would fail to meet the section's third prong,
which requires a given restraint to unreasonably restrain trade.45 If
a restraint is reasonable, section 1 is inapplicable. In determining
whether a restraint is reasonable, the Supreme Court applies either
the per se test or the rule of reason test.
If an activity is illegal per se, the plaintiff must only prove that
the defendant engaged in the activity and need not prove the activi-
43. Id. at 786-87.
44. Senate Committee Takes Swings at Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 63 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 743 (Dec. 17, 1993).
45. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Sherman Act only reach-
es those restraints that are unreasonable. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
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ty's anticompetitive effect.' Conversely, the rule of reason test
requires a comprehensive and sometimes complex review of the
activity's anticompetitive effect.47 Because the per se rule may
"over deter by intimidating businesses from engaging in conduct
which may turn out to be more beneficial than harmful to competi-
tion," the Supreme Court has gradually limited the types of activi-
ties falling within the per se rule.48 Generally, the Court applies
the rule only to horizontal arrangements 49 under section 1 that in-
volve activities such as price fixing, 50 division of markets,5' or
group boycotts.52
If an activity is not illegal per se, courts, in reviewing a section
1 claim, will evaluate the practice under the rule of reason. The
rule of reason requires the court to review the competitive effects
46. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); Northern Pacific
R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). In Northern Pacific, the Court explained
that:
iThere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively pre-
sumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as
to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of re-
straints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit
of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation[,] ... an inquiry so often
wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Id. at 5.
47. ANDERSON & ROGERS, supra note 20, at 261.
48. Id.
49. Horizontal arrangements are agreements among competitors at the same level,
e.g., manufacturers conspiring to set the price at which they will sell to all retailers,
and are considered per se violations. I LAWRENCE A. SULuLVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ANTURUST 106 (1977). Vertical arrangements are agreements between those
at different levels of the marketing-manufacturing structure, e.g., a distributor and its
retailer conspiring to set the price at which they will sell products within a certain
region. Id. at 657. Vertical agreements are considered to have potential benefits not
present in horizontal arrangements. Thus, except for pricing arrangements, vertical
agreements are generally reviewed under the rule of reason and are not considered
illegal per se. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
50. E.g., United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
51. E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
52. E.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
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of the business practice and weigh any potential benefits against
the practice's negative effect on competition.53 Due to the unique
nature of professional sports leagues, where teams are both com-
petitors and completely interdependent upon each other, federal
courts have repeatedly analyzed those leagues which are not ex-
empt from antitrust laws under the rule of reason rather than the
per se approach. 54
In recent years, many economists have stressed consumer wel-
fare as the exclusive goal of antitrust law.55 They recommend that
courts applying the rule of reason focus on whether the activity
harms consumer welfare by decreasing output and increasing pric-
es. 56 If the activity does not have this negative effect, then it is not
anticompetitive and does not violate section .57 The current trend
appears to favor this view that the law should permit modes of
integration that actually benefit the consumer by enhancing the
efficiency of the integrating organizations."
Applying this thinking to sports leagues, one prominent theorist
has noted that "some activities can only be carried out jointly.
Perhaps the leading example is league sports. When a league of
professional lacrosse teams is formed, it would be pointless to
declare their cooperation illegal on the ground that there are no
53. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,
497 (1988); FTC v. Independent Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457 (1986); NCAA
v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
54. See, e.g., North American Soccer League v. National Football League, 670
F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F.
Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
55. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTrITRUST PARADOX: A POLiCY AT WAR WlTH ITSELF
20 (1978).
56. Id.
57. Id.; see, e.g., Paschall v. Kansas City Star, 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984). In
Paschall v. Kansas City Star, the court held that vertical integration by a newspaper
publisher did not constitute an illegal restraint of trade since plaintiff independent
carriers were permitted to deliver newspapers for other publishers as well; thus, barri-
ers to entry into newspaper publishing did not increase. 727 F.2d 692, 702 (8th Cir.
1984).
58. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANiT'RUST
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMLICATIONS 240 (1988).
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other professional lacrosse teams."'59
Thus, even if Baseball were deemed a group of independent
entities engaged in interstate commerce, the League's current busi-
ness activities-i.e., regulating franchise relocation-would not fall
prey to section 1. Since collaboration among teams is necessary to
effect viable competition, under a rule of reason analysis, the busi-
ness of Baseball would not constitute an unreasonable restraint of
trade.
C. Baseball Does Not Act as a Monopolist Under Section 2
Just as Baseball's activities would not constitute unreasonable
restraints of trade in violation of section 1 were the exemption lift-
ed-since the rule of reason analysis conducted under section 1 and
the anti-competitive effects analysis conducted under section 2 are
similar-the league's operations would not fall prey to section 2
either.6° Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolizing,
attempting to monopolize or conspiring to monopolize any part of
interstate trade or commerce." Section 2 claims are never subject
to a per se analysis. In order to state a monopolization claim under
section 2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must allege: (1) defen-
dant's possession of monopoly power in the relevant geographic
and product market; and (2) defendant's willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from a justifiable busi-
ness decision.62 Thus, the mere possession of a monopoly does not
constitute the offense of monopolization. Rather, the monopolist
must abuse that power. The ultimate question in such a claim is
whether the monopolist's activity has an anticompetitive effect.
A claim against Baseball under section 2 might allege that the
league is unlawfully maintaining monopoly power with the purpose
of discouraging new teams and leagues from competing against it.63
59. Bork, supra note 55, at 278.
60. For further analysis of the applicability of section 2 of the Sherman Act to
professional sports leagues, see Dale & Hunt, supra note 21, at 350-54.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
62. See United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
63. See, e.g., Piazza v. Major League Baseball, No. 92-7173, 1993 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 10552, at *33 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1993).
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Courts addressing this issue with respect to other sports-i.e., foot-
ball-however, have held that groups attempting to acquire a fran-
chise and join the league do not have standing to sue under section
2 because they are seeking to join and not to compete with the
league." Thus, the relevant caselaw suggests that the only permis-
sible claims under section 2 are those emanating from competing
leagues and from teams in such leagues."5
Nonetheless, in the recent Piazza decision, the court addressed
the question of whether a plaintiff attempting to purchase and
transfer an existing Baseball franchise to another city maintains a
legitimate section 2 claim against the league for interfering with the
66Thcortransaction, The court concluded that Major League Baseball
willfully maintains monopoly power in a relevant product mar-
ket-the market for Baseball teams generally 67 This assessment
counters the wisdom of prior decisions alluded to above and is at
best questionable.68
Furthermore, in order to monopolize, a business must possess
market power.6 9 Market power allows a business to affect the price
which will prevail upon the relevant market.70 Whether a seller
maintains such power depends upon the reaction to price changes
initiated by that seller.71 Buyer reaction, in turn, depends upon the
availability of substitutes for the seller's product.72 Because Base-
ball teams compete with not only other sports franchises but the
whole of the entertainment industry, if Baseball were to charge un-
reasonable ticket prices, consumers would look elsewhere for enter-
tainment. Thus, Baseball does not possess the requisite market
power to monopolize the relevant market.
64. See, e.g., Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 788
(3d Cir. 1983) (summarily dismissing the Grizzlies section 2 claim because Congress
had specifically permitted the NFL's monopoly with respect to determining franchise
location).
65. Dale & Hunt, supra note 21, at 354.
66. Piazza, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10552, at *30-*36.
67. Id. at *33.
68. See discussion infra part III.C.
69. SULLIVAN, supra note 58, at 30.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 30-31.
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Il. THE EVOLUTION OF BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
A. The Early Antitrust Challenges
American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase73 involved
the first antitrust challenge against Baseball.74 In Chase, Chicago's
American League franchise brought an action against Chase, one
of the team's players, to prevent him from jumping to the Federal
League's Buffalo franchise while still under contract with Chicago.
Chase alleged that the player's contract constituted an illegal re-
straint of trade and was therefore a violation of the Sherman Act.75
Although the Supreme Court of the State of New York held that
the business of Baseball did not constitute interstate commerce and
thus was not subject to the Sherman Act, the court ruled for Chase
and dissolved the lower court's injunction.76 The court explained
that it would not interfere with the personal liberty of a citizen by
"controlling his free right to labor wherever and for whom he
pleases. 77
Ironically, while the court in Chase openly rejected application
of the federal antitrust laws to the business of Baseball, the opinion
represented a successful challenge to the reserve clause 78 and frus-
73. 149 N.Y.S. 6 (1914).
74. For further analysis of the development of Baseball's antitrust exemption, see
Richard L. Irwin, A Historical Review of Litigation in Baseball, 1 MARQ. L. REV. 283
(1991).
75. 149 N.Y.S. at 15-16.
76. Id. at 20.
77. Id. In addressing the defendant's antitrust allegation the court explained that
baseball is merely "an amusement, a sport, a game that comes clearly within the civil
and criminal law of the state." Id. at 17. The court also stated that baseball was not a
commodity or an article of merchandise subject to Congress' power to regulate inter-
state commerce, and therefore, was outside the jurisdiction of the federal antitrust
laws. id. at 16-17.
78. The reserve clause was a provision in a player's contract which conferred
upon the organized baseball club which first signed a player a continuing and exclu-
sive right to his services. At the same time, other teams could not extend to the play-
er another offer. Therefore, the player was bound to the team perpetually. See
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 362-63 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258, 264-65, 282 (1972).
Under the existing collective bargaining agreement, a veteran player whose con-
tract expires becomes a "free agent" and is free to negotiate a contract with another
team. His old team may then match the other team's offer within a set time period or
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trated efforts by the American and National Leagues to resist fur-
ther attempts by the Federal League to recruit their players.79 This
created a great deal of friction between the two factions. Although
they subsequently attempted to reconcile their differences, negotia-
tions ultimately collapsed.80 The Federal League, facing increasing
financial difficulties, sued organized baseball for conspiring to re-
strain trade in violation of the federal antitrust laws.81 After several
months without a decision, the two sides initiated settlement talks.
By the end of the year, the two sides reached a satisfactory accom-
modation, and the Federal Baseball League withdrew its antitrust
suit. 2
The Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore ("Baltimore Club"),
however, was dissatisfied with the settlement agreement. As a
result, the owners of the Baltimore Club filed suit in the Federal
District Court of Philadelphia in 1916, alleging that organized base-
ball had conspired in restraint of trade. Anticipating an out-of-
court settlement, the Baltimore Club withdrew its complaint.83
When the Baltimore Club did not receive the anticipated settle-
ment, it again filed suit-this time in Washington, D.C. The Su-
preme Court of the District of Columbia found in favor of the
Baltimore Club, awarding it $80,000, which was tripled under the
Sherman Act to $240,000. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia reversed, concluding that baseball exhibi-
tions do not constitute commerce under the Sherman Act.8 5 The
the player will join his new team. See Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major
League Baseball Player's Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). In Kansas City Royals,
Baseball owners unsuccessfully challenged the decision of an arbitration pan-
el-established through collective bargaining between the League and the players-to
allow players whose contracts had expired at the end of the season to declare them-
selves free agents. Id. at 623.
79. MURDOCK, supra note 1, at 109.
80. Id. at 113.
81. Id. at 114.
82. Id. at 117.
83. Id.
84. See National League v. Federal Baseball Club, Inc., 269 F. 681, 682 (D.C.
Cir. 1920). affd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
85. 269 F. at 685.
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Court of Appeals explained:
The business in which the appellants were engaged, as we
have seen, was the giving of exhibitions of baseball. A
game of baseball is not susceptible of being transferred.
The players, it is true, travel from place to place in inter-
state commerce, but they are not the game. Not until they
come into contact with their opponents on the baseball field
and the contest opens does the game come into existence.
It is local in its beginning and in its end. Nothing is trans-
ferred in the process to those who patronize it. The exer-
tions of skill and agility which they witness may excite in
them pleasurable emotions, just as might a view of a beau-
tiful picture or a masterly performance of some drama; but
the game effects no exchange of things according to the
meaning of [trade and commerce].86
Underlying the court's decision was its reasoning that organized
baseball was not involved in any interstate activity. It upheld the
legality of utilizing the reserve clause to ensure an even distribution
of talent among teams. 8 The court noted:
If the reserve clause did not exist, the highly skillful players
would be absorbed by the more wealthy clubs, and thus
some clubs in the league would so far outstrip others in
playing ability that the contests between the superior and
inferior clubs would be uninteresting, and the public would
refuse to patronize them."
The case eventually reached the United States Supreme Court.8 9
In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs,9° the Supreme Court unanimously af-
firmed the Court of Appeals' decision, finding that "[tihe business
86. Id. at 684-85.
87. Id. at 687.
88. Id.
89. See National League v. Federal Baseball Club, Inc., 269 F. 681, 688 (D.C.
Cir. 1921) (vacating previous judgment of the court and reversing the judgment of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in order that the case be carried to the
United States Supreme Court).
90. Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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is giving exhibitions of baseball, which are purely state affairs."9'
The Court emphasized that travelling to games is purely incidental
to giving exhibitions and cannot comprise interstate commerce. 9
Thus, Federal Baseball provided professional Baseball with immu-
nity from antitrust laws while tacitly acknowledging the validity of
the reserve clause. The importance of this decision was not fully
realized, however, until the Supreme Court re-examined Baseball's
exemption from the antitrust laws over thirty years later.
B. Toolson: The Court Stands its Ground
In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,93 the United States Su-
preme Court for the first time was confronted with a direct chal-
lenge to Baseball's reserve system. 94 Instead of addressing the
merits, the Court held that:
Congress has had the ruling [in Federal Baseball] under
consideration but has not seen fit to bring such business
under these laws by legislation having prospective effect.
The business has thus been left for thirty years to develop,
on the understanding that it was not subject to existing anti-
trust legislation. The present cases ask us to overrule the
prior decision and, with retrospective effect, hold the legis-
lation applicable. We think that if there are evils in this
field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust
laws it should be by legislation.9
5
The Court reaffirmed Federal Baseball to the extent that Con-
gress did not intend the antitrust laws to apply to the business of
91. Id. at 208.
92. Id. at 208-09.
93. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
94. Toolson was decided together with two companion cases. Kowalski v. Chan-
dler, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 436 U.S. 356 (1953); Corbett v. Chandler,
202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 436 U.S. 356 (1953). The two companion cases
dealt not with the reserve clause, but with other aspects of league structure, such as the
Major League Agreement which, according to plaintiffs, unreasonably restricted the
number and location of major league franchises and prevented them from obtaining
major league status. That the Court's holding applied to the circumstances of all three
cases suggests that it understood Baseball's exemption to extend beyond the reserve
system.
95. 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
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Baseball.96 Thus, Toolson marked the first indication that the Court
had determined that any alteration of Baseball's exemption from
antitrust regulation must ultimately come from Congress and not
the judiciaryY
C. Flood: Different Era Same Result
In 1972, the reserve clause received yet another legal challenge.
In Flood v. Kuhn,98 Curt Flood, a player who had been traded
against his will, brought suit claiming that the forced trade violated
his constitutional rights. 99 Specifically, he alleged that the forced
trade violated antitrust laws as well as the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition against involuntary servitude.'0 0
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New
York refused to grant him an injunction which would have allowed
him to negotiate with other teams.01 On appeal, the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's decision on the basis of the Feder-
al Baseball and Toolson decisions which placed the duty on Con-
gress to address Baseball's exemption."°2 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the decision, citing the doctrine of stare decisis.0 3 The
Court emphasized that any change in federal antitrust policy must
96. Id.
97. Id. Several years after Toolson, the Supreme Court further articulated its
rational for continuing to uphold Federal Baseball. In Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), the Court noted:
Vast efforts had gone into the development and organization of Baseball
since [the Federal Baseball] decision, and enormous capital had been invest-
ed in reliance on its permanence. Congress had chosen to make no change.
All this, combined with the flood of litigation that would follow its repudia-
tion, the harassment that would ensue, and the retroactive effect of such a
decision, led the Court to the practical result that it should sustain the un-
equivocal line of authority reaching over many years.
Id. at 450-51.
98. 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), affd,
407 U.S. 258 (1972).
99. 316 F. Supp. at 272.
100. Id. The Thirteenth Amendment states in relevant part: "Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
101. 407 U.S. at 285.
102. 443 F.2d at 268.
103. 407 U.S. at 284-85.
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originate from Congress."
In the wake of Flood v. Kuhn, litigation involving Baseball's
antitrust exemption focused less on the reserve clause and more on
non-labor related issues. This phenomenon resulted primarily from
the 1976 Basic Agreement which effectively dissolved the reserve
clause and granted veteran players a much stronger bargaining
position.105 With the reserve clause intact, Baseball, by virtue of
its exemption, was able to control two important aspects of the
player market, the selection and continued employment of players
and the equalization of playing strengths'0 6 As a result of the
Basic Agreement and the dissolution of the reserve clause, there-
fore, much of the potency of Baseball's exemption was lost.
Due to the Basic Agreement and the Supreme Court's unequiv-
ocal mandate in Flood that any alteration of Baseball's antitrust
exemption must emanate directly from Congress, litigation involv-
ing Baseball's antitrust exemption has surfaced only sporadically
since that decision. More than twenty years passed before formida-
ble litigation arose challenging the veracity of the Flood decision.
H. THE IMPACT OF PIAZZA V. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL ON
BASEBALL'S EXEMPTION
A. The Course of Events-The St. Petersburg Giants?
Piazza v. Major League Baseball107 arose in response to the
thwarted transfer of the San Francisco Giants baseball club to St.
Petersburg, Florida. 08 Vincent M. Piazza, a Pennsylvania business-
man, had formed a limited partnership with several other investors
for the purpose of acquiring the Giants and moving the team to
Florida."° Questioning the character of several members of the
limited partnership, Major League Baseball rejected Piazza's pro-
104. Id.
105. Irwin, supra note 74, at 293.
106. H. Ward Classen, Three Strikes and You're Out: An Investigation of Profes-
sional Baseball's Antitrust exemption, 21 AKRON L. REV. 369, 384 (1988).
107. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, No. 92-7173, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10552 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1993).
108. Id. at *2.
109. Id. at *3.
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posal to purchase and relocate the Giants and ultimately accepted
a considerably less substantial offer from a different group of buy-
ers.
110
Consequently, Piazza brought suit in the Eastern District Court
of Pennsylvania, alleging, among other claims, violations of sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act."' Piazza asserted that
Major League Baseball monopolized the market for professional
baseball franchises by precluding the sale and transfer of any given
team without League approval." 2 In particular, Piazza alleged that:
Baseball's actions placed direct and indirect restraints on
the purchase, sale, transfer and relocation of Major League
Baseball teams and on competition in the purchase, sale,
transfer and relocation of such teams, all of which directly
and indirectly affect interstate commerce; Major League
Baseball is an unreasonable and unlawful monopoly created,
intended and maintained by defendants for the purpose of
permitting defendant team owners, an intentionally select
and limited group, to reap enormous profits; and Baseball
achieved these restraints on trade by engaging in an unlaw-
ful combination and conspiracy... the substantial terms of
which have been to eliminate all competition in the relevant
market [defined as the market for American League and
National League Baseball teams], to exclude plaintiffs from
participating in the relevant market, to establish monopoly
control of the relevant market and to unreasonably restrain
trade by denying the sale, transfer and relocation of the
Giants to the Tampa Bay area.'
Thus, according to Piazza, the League effectively restrained his
right to engage in the business of Major League Baseball by pre-
cluding his partnership from competitively bidding on the San
Francisco Giants."1
4
110. Id. at *5-*7.
111. Id. at *10.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *30 n.13 (citing Complaint at 104, 110-12).
114. Id. (citing Complaint at 112).
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In response to Piazza's allegations, the League argued that:
(1) plaintiffs have failed to allege that Baseball's actions
restrained competition in a relevant market; (2) plaintiffs
have no standing to assert a Sherman Act claim; and (3)
Baseball is exempt from liability under the Sherman Act.115
These contentions set the stage for the most comprehensive analy-
sis of the interplay between the Sherman Act and Baseball in re-
cent jurisprudence.
B. The Opinion-Shame On You Baseball!
Addressing Baseball's first contention-that plaintiffs did not
allege an injury to competition in a relevant product market be-
cause plaintiffs were seeking to join Baseball rather than to com-
pete with it-the Piazza court attempted to distinguish the case
before it from Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League,11 6
which Baseball invoked in support of its position. 7
In Mid-South Grizzlies, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of antitrust
claims brought against the NFL by the Grizzlies, a former WFL
team.1 The court found that the Grizzlies had shown "no actual
or potential injury to competition resulting from the rejection of
their application for an NFL franchise.""' 9 The court's decision
was premised primarily on the court's acceptance of "major-league
professional football" as the relevant product market for Sherman
Act purposes. 20 The court found that there was no evidence on re-
cord of a product market among league members susceptible to
economic injury-i.e., between the Grizzlies, located in Memphis,
Tennessee, and the St. Louis NFL franchise located almost 300
miles away.121 The court declined to state, however, that such a
115. Id. at *30.
116. 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
117. Piazza, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10552, at *33.
118. For further discussion of the case, see supra notes 37-43 and accompanying
text.
119. Id. (citing Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 787).
120. Id. (citing Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 783).
121. Id. at *33 (citing Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 787).
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scenario could never arise. 22 The court noted that "within certain
geographic submarkets two league members [could] compete with
one another for ticket buyers, for local broadcast revenue, and for
sale of the concession items like food and beverages and team
paraphernalia."' 2' Nevertheless, the court denied the Grizzlies'
franchise application, concluding that it had no relevance to this
particular product market and thus could not have injured competi-
tion.124
The Piazza court, in rejecting the applicability of Mid-South
Grizzlies to the instant case, pointed to two particular distinc-
tions:' 25
First, unlike the Grizzlies, plaintiffs here were not seeking
to join Major League Baseball through creation of a fran-
chise but were attempting to purchase an existing team.
The import of this distinction turns upon the second distinc-
tion, which is that also unlike the Grizzlies, who identified
the relevant product market as major-league professional
football generally, plaintiffs here have identified the rele-
vant product market as the market for existing American
League and National League Baseball teams. 26
By identifying the relevant product market in the instant case as the
team franchise market and not an intra-league market comprised of
Major League Baseball generally, the Piazza court rejected Base-
ball's contention that plaintiffs failed to allege a restraint on com-
petition in a relevant product market. 27
Concluding that Baseball's alleged exclusion of plaintiffs from
a relevant market constitutes the sort of injury that Congress sought
to redress through the antitrust laws, the Piazza court turned to
Baseball's second contention concerning plaintiffs' standing to sue
under the Sherman Act. Since plaintiffs had identified a "unique
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 787).
124. Id. (citing Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 786).
125. Id.
126. Id. at *33-*34.
127. Id. at *34.
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and particularized injury to themselves" regarding an alleged un-
lawful exclusion from a relevant product market, the court rejected
Baseball's contention that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.128
Having validated plaintiffs standing to sue under the Sherman
Act, the court moved to Baseball's motion to dismiss plaintiff's
Sherman Act claim-predicated on the notion that the United
States Supreme Court exempted Baseball from liability under the
federal antitrust laws. 2 9 The court ascribed Baseball's exemption
to the three seminal cases, Federal Baseball 30 Toolson,'13' and
Flood. 32
Defining the scope of the exemption as established by the fore-
going decisions, the court noted that the factual context in each of
these three cases involved the reserve clause.13 3 Consequently, the
issue the court deemed determinative of the instant conflict was
whether the exemption is confined to that circumstance, which was
not presented here, or whether the exemption applies to the "busi-
ness of Baseball" generally and not to one particular facet of the
game.134
The court surmised that while an expansive view of Baseball's
exemption may have been correct in the particular contexts of Fed-
eral Baseball and Toolson, the Court in Flood stripped any
precedential value those cases may have had beyond the particular
facts there involved, i.e., the reserve clause. 35 The court then set
out to explain Flood's rationale for following Federal Baseball.36
128. Id. at *42-*44.
129. Id. at *43.
130. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). See supra text accompanying notes 85-92.
131. 346 U.S. 356 (1953). See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
132. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 98-104.
133. Piazza, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10552, at *53.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *54.
136. The court summarized the Supreme Court's reasoning in Flood as follows:
mhe Court first looked back to Toolson and uncovered the following four
reasons why the Court there had followed Federal Baseball: (a) Congressio-
nal awareness for three decades of the Court's ruling in Federal Baseball,
coupled with congressional inaction. (b) The fact that baseball was left alone
to develop for that period upon the understanding that the reserve system
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The court explained that the Supreme Court in Flood accorded
Federal Baseball and Toolson the "continuing benefit of stare deci-
sis by virtue of its emphasis on continued positive congressional
inaction and concerns over retroactivity."' 37 The Piazza court fur-
ther explained that the Flood Court acknowledged that "[w]ith its
reserve system enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust laws,
Baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anoma-
ly." 138
Based upon this analysis, the Piazza court inferred that the
Supreme Court construed the Federal Baseball exemption as limit-
ed to the reserve clause.139  Since the reserve clause was not at
issue in Piazza, the court rejected Baseball's argument that it is
exempt from antitrust laws.14°
C. Piazza's Misconceptions-A Lesson in the Significance of
Judicial Precedent
The Piazza court's interpretation of Flood v. Kuhn threatens to
return Major League Baseball to the confines of antitrust regulation
by limiting the application of its exemption to the now defunct
reserve system. Aside from the numerous policy considerations
contravening this result,' 4 the court's legal foundations for this
conclusion appear rather attenuated.
Perhaps the most overt example of the Piazza court's miscon-
ceptions lies in its categorical rejection of the decision in Charles
0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn,"2 which offered a more expansive inter-
pretation of Flood.143 In Finley, then Commissioner of Baseball
was not subject to existing federal antitrust laws. (c) A reluctance to overrule
Federal Baseball with consequent retroactive effect. (d) A professed desire
that any needed remedy be provided by legislation rather than by court de-
cree.
Id. at *54-*55 (citing Flood, 407 U.S. at 273-74).
137. Id. at *56.
138. Id. (citing 407 U.S. at 282).
139. Id. at *57.
140. Id. at *63.
141. See infra part IV.
142. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
143. Piazza, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10552, at *56.
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Bowie Kuhn did not approve the sale by Charles 0. Finley & Co.
("Finley"), the owner of the Oakland Athletics ("Oakland") base-
ball club, of contract rights in three Oakland players to other
clubs.1" Finley subsequently brought suit, claiming, among other
things, that "the Commissioner conspired with others in violation
of the antitrust laws."1 45 The district court held that the Commis-
sioner was exempt from antitrust laws based on Federal Baseball
and granted summary judgment in his favor.
Like plaintiffs in Piazza, Finley argued on appeal that the ex-
emption applies only to the reserve system. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed, however, find-
ing that "[d]espite the two references in the Flood case to the re-
serve system, it appears clear from the entire opinions in the three
baseball cases, as well as from Radovich, that the Supreme Court
intended to exempt the business of Baseball, not any particular
facet of that business, from the federal antitrust laws."'
14 6
In reaching this conclusion, the Finley court explained that it
looked back to Federal Baseball and Toolson and concluded that
the Supreme Court had focused in those cases upon the business of
Baseball, not just the reserve clause.147 The Finley court added that
while the Supreme Court stated in Flood v. Kuhn that
"[pirofessional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate
commerce" it nevertheless decided to "adhere once again to Feder-
al Baseball and Toolson and to their application to professional
baseball."'14
8
Because this represents the Finley court's entire substantive dis-
cussion of Flood without noting the extent to which that decision
allegedly turned upon the reserve clause, the Piazza court dismissed
144. Finley, 569 F.2d at 531.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 541. In Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957),
the Supreme Court held that professional football is subject to antitrust laws due to the
volume of interstate business involved. In reaching its conclusion, the Court explained
that the exemption from antitrust laws carved for baseball applies exclusively to that
sport.
147. Finley, 569 F.2d at 541.
148. Id. (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282, 284 (1972)).
1993]
588 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
Finley as inaccurate and as an unbinding precedent.1 49 The Piazza
court further explained that "[a]pplication of the doctrine of stare
decisis simply permits no other way to read Flood than as confin-
ing the precedential value of Federal Baseball and Toolson to the
precise facts there involved.' 5 0
Before Flood, the Piazza court conceded that lower courts were
bound by both the rule of Federal Baseball and Toolson that the
business of Baseball is not interstate commerce and, thus, not with-
in the Sherman Act.15 ' The court's rejection of an expansive view
of Baseball's exemption derives from its unwillingness to accept
Finley's reading of Flood simply because the Seventh Circuit, in
Finley, addressed the issue only marginally.'52
Moreover, the Piazza court ironically invoked Radovich to
support the proposition that Baseball's exemption is limited," 3
when, in fact, Radovich supports the opposite conclusion. In
Radovich, the Supreme Court asserted that Baseball's exemption
applies only to the business of organized Baseball, prohibiting its
application to other professional sports. 54 Though this statement
clearly limits exemption from antitrust laws to the sport of base-
ball, it also suggests that within the context of baseball, the exemp-
tion applies generally to "the business of organized baseball" and
not merely to the reserve system.
Aside from misapplying Radovich, the Piazza court ignored
several other Supreme Court decisions suggesting that the Federal
Baseball exemption extends to the "business of baseball" in general
149. Piazza, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10552, at *59-*63.
150. Id. at *60.
151. Id. at *62.
152. For the same reason, the Piazza court also rejected the numerous other cases
Baseball cited in support of its view. Id. at *63 n.22 (citing Professional Baseball
Schools & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085 (11th Cir. 1982); Triple-A Baseball
Club Assocs. v. Northeastern Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 935 (1988); Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir.
1974); Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001, 1007 (1971)).
153. Id. at *62 n.21.
154. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1957).
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and not merely to the reserve clause. In United States v.
Shubert,'55 the Court explained that it "was dealing [in Federal
Baseball] with the business of baseball and nothing else."156 Simi-
larly, in United States v. International Boxing Club,'15 7 the Court
held that Toolson applied to the business of baseball and did not
extend to "other [sports leagues] merely because of the circum-
stances that they are also based on the performance of local exhibi-
tions." '' 1
The court went so far as to argue that even if the exemption
extends beyond the reserve system, that the exemption covers the
"business of baseball" does little to "delineate the contours of the
exemption"-i.e., what constitutes a relevant product market for the
purposes of determining a redressable Sherman Act Injury. 59 The
Piazza court concluded that even if it were to accept Finley, it
retained the latitude to limit that decision to particular circumstanc-
es. Thus, the Piazza court interpreted the Federal Baseball exemp-.
tion, in light of Finley, as "one related to a particular market-the
market comprised of the exhibition of baseball games-not a par-
ticular type of restraint (such as the reserve clause) or a particular
entity (such as Major League Baseball). ' '160
Operating under this ostensibly "expansive view" of the exemp-
tion, the Piazza court sought to determine in which market Baseball
allegedly restrained competition. The court conceded that Baseball
is immune from Sherman Act liability in the market comprised of
baseball exhibitions.' 6 ' The court emphasized, however, that were
another market implicated, even the expansive version of the Fed-
eral Baseball exemption as articulated by the Finley court would
not apply.162
According to the plaintiffs in Piazza, the relevant product mar-
155. 348 U.S. 222 (1955).
156. Id. at.228.
157. 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
158. Id. at 242.
159. Piazza, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10552, at *64.
160. Id. at *66.
161. Id. at *67.
162. Id.
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ket at issue in the case was the market for ownership of existing
major league professional baseball teams. 163 The court reduced this
market to the following components: "(1) the product being sold
is an ownership interest in professional baseball teams; (2) the
sellers are team owners; and (3) the buyers are those who would
like to become team owners."'164
Conversely, the court narrowed the expansive version of the
Federal Baseball exemption to a market defined by these compo-
nents: "(1) the product is the exhibition of baseball games; (2) the
sellers, as with the market defined by plaintiffs, are team owners;
and (3) the buyers are fans and, perhaps, the broadcast industry." 165
Thus, the Piazza court couched these differing views of the rele-
vant market in terms of different products and different consum-
ers-while plaintiffs view the product as baseball teams and the
owners as consumers, defendants view the product as baseball
games and the fans as consumers.66
As the court suggested, "it is conceivable that, although the
precise products in plaintiffs' market and the exempted market are
different, these markets nonetheless overlap to such an extent that
they should be treated identically for purposes of the expansive
view of Federal Baseball."' 67 More specifically, the acquisition of
a business that is engaged in baseball exhibitions may still relate
to the unique characteristics of baseball exhibitions. While this line
of reasoning follows logically and seems sensible in light of the
language of Federal Baseball, the court refused to pursue this anal-
ysis because it lacked a sufficient factual record on which to base
a decision.16 8 Since the purchase and transfer of a baseball fran-
chise relates to baseball exhibitions-i.e., without a franchise in
San Francisco, it would be difficult for baseball exhibitions to take
place in that city-the court need not have speculated whether the
facts in the instant case indicated any overlap between the two
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at *68.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *74.
168. Id.
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defined "markets."' 169
Another point on which the Piazza court provided a less than
satisfactory analysis involves its explanation of recent judicial con-
structions of the expansive version of the exemption. Certain
courts have defined the exempted market as that which is central
to the "unique characteristics and needs" of baseball. 7 ' Though the
Piazza court conceded that "there seems to be agreement among
these courts and others that, defined in this way, the exempted
market includes (1) the reserve system and (2) matters of league
structure,"' 71 the court asserted that "no court has analyzed or ap-
plied the expansive view of the Federal Baseball exemption to the
market for ownership interests in existing baseball teams."' 72
While the court is correct in its assessment of the dearth of deci-
sions on this particular issue, the court failed to point out that the
market for ownership in existing baseball teams is inextricably
linked to matters of league structure.
Finally, even if Baseball were not exempt from scrutiny under
the antitrust laws, the League's intervention in the transfer and
relocation of the Giants does not constitute a violation of either
sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act. Under a section 1 rule of
reason analysis, the benefits to the consumer-such as sustaining
the revenue associated with a Major League team--outweigh the
harmful effects to competition-such as the inability of a buyer to
purchase and relocate a franchise for personal financial gain.'73
169. Even if the court viewed the relevant market more narrowly as the market
for the purchase and transfer of the Giants only, where there was only one seller and
one buyer group, including only those interested in the Giants, the overlap into the
market for baseball exhibitions would remain the same.
170. Postema v. National League, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1488 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972)), rev'd on other grounds, 998 F.2d
60 (2d Cir. 1993); Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F.
Supp. 263, 268-69, 271 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding Federal Baseball exemption not
applicable to market for broadcast of baseball games).
171. See Piazza, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10552, at *70; see, e.g., Professional
Baseball Schools & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085 (11th Cir. 1982); Postema,
799 F. Supp. at 1489; Henderson, 541 F. Supp. at 269; State v. Milwaukee Braves,
Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Wis. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966).
172. Piazza, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10552, at *72.
173. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, a claim under section 2 must be brought by a competing
league or a team in such a league. 74 Rejecting a buyer's attempt
to purchase and transfer an existing franchise, therefore, does not
constitute monopolization.
IV. THE CURRENT VALUE OF THE EXEMPTION
A. Revenue and Relocation
1. Revenue
Although Baseball's antitrust exemption arguably provides it
with a competitive advantage over other professional sports, par-
ticularly in its ability to generate revenue, the Sports Broadcasting
Act of 196111 allows all leagues to act collectively to maximize
their revenues. Since its enactment, every league has experienced
increased broadcasting revenues. 176 As greater percentages of prof-
its come from broadcasting revenues instead of gate receipts, Base-
ball's antitrust exemption is becoming less of an advantage. More-
over, Baseball's general exemption from antitrust regulation has
been rendered inapplicable to conspiratory practices in broadcast-
ing. Since broadcasting presently accounts for a large percentage
of Baseball's overall revenue,177 those who argue that the current
174. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 states in
relevant part:
The antitrust laws . . . shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among
persons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sports of
football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs partic-
ipating in professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey contests sells
or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such league's member
clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of football, baseball, basket-
ball, or hockey, as the case may be, engaged in or conducted by such clubs.
Id.
176. Classen, supra, note 106, at 372.
177. See, Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, Inc., 541 F.
Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982). In Henderson, a Houston radio station, KYST, sued the
Houston Astros and another radio station, KENR, charging violations of antitrust laws.
Id. at 264. In particular, KYST alleged that the Astros cancelled its contract to broad-
cast Astro baseball games in a conspiracy with KENR to "divide and allocate advertis-
ing and audience territories in the greater Houston-Galveston radio broadcasting mar-
ket, to eliminate competition for advertising revenue and listening audiences, and thus
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business of Baseball therefore requires antitrust regulation ignore
the reality that much of what they deem "business" does not lie
within the parameters of the Federal Baseball exemption.
2. Relocation
Unlike the NFL which shares 90 percent of its revenues equal-
ly, Baseball shares only its joint revenues and a small portion of
gate receipts. 178 In addition, there are enormous differences in club
resources based on market size. 179 Baseball player salaries and
benefits, on the other hand, are determined on an industry-wide
basis. 80 This factor alone suggests that the pressure to relocate is
stronger in Baseball than in football.
Due to the unique nature of sports complexes (cities construct
such stadiums almost exclusively to attract professional sports fran-
chises), the relocation of a Major League Baseball team would
place an undue financial burden on the city losing the franchise and
consequently, the taxpayers. Stadiums and sports complexes cost
several hundred million dollars to build and are generally financed
by state and local authorities, which in turn are financed by the
taxpayer.' Because cities cannot relocate their stadiums and stadi-
ums have few secondary uses, it is imperative that cities attract and
retain sports franchises.
Even if several professional franchises in a metropolitan area
utilize a stadium, individual teams still maintain strong bargaining
power. Teams often threaten to relocate in order to negotiate a
more favorable lease.' Moreover, they often insist on the exclu-
impose horizontal restraints on that radio market area." Id. The court held that broad-
casting was not central enough to Baseball to fall under the purview of the exemption
and consequently denied defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. at 271-72.
178. Clark C. Griffith, Good Reason for Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, N.Y.
Tom, Jan. 17, 1993, § 8, at 9.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Classen, supra note 106, at 374 (citing PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & Co.,
REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC AND TAX IMPACTS OF THE CAMDEN YARDS STADIUM
DEVELOPMENT (1987)).
182. Id. at 374. The Baltimore Orioles and Baltimore Colts threatened to relocate
their franchises unless they received greater benefits from the city of Baltimore. The
Colts subsequently moved to Indianapolis when the city of Indianapolis offered the
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sive right to use a stadium or to maintain- the right to veto any
potential tenant.'83 As a result, stadiums tend to be under-utilized
and may operate at a considerable loss."'
Nevertheless, cities accept economic inefficiencies in operating
a stadium because the franchises and their accompanying industries
generate substantial revenues for the local business community.185
Cities often provide financial incentives to retain teams because of
the substantial loss of tax revenues and the negative effect on the
business community if a franchise relocates.' 86
To further the point, if Baseball were not exempt from federal
antitrust regulation, the San Francisco Giants would have played in
St. Petersburg last season. Consequently, the municipality of San
Francisco and its taxpayers would find themselves on the losing
end of commercial warfare and suffer the consequences. If Base-
ball loses its ability to self-regulate, anyone could purchase any
franchise and move it anywhere. 87 While proponents of revoking
the exemption ironically believe that imposing antitrust regulation
will help restore the game of baseball to its pure artistic form,
prostituting a professional baseball team to the highest bidder re-
duces the game to a mere commodity and further sterilizes its en-
tertainment value.
team a better financial package than the city of Baltimore. Likewise, the Oakland
Raiders relocated to Los Angeles to obtain greater financial benefits. The New York
Jets and New York Giants play their games in New Jersey for similar reasons. Id. at
374 n.56.
183. id. at 374.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 374-75.
186. Id. at 375. Such incentives include free renovations, building sky boxes or
new facilities, reduced taxes and low rents for municipal stadiums. Id. at 375 n.58.
187. Recently, a group of financiers in Washington, D.C. offered $150 million to
purchase the San Diego Padres and to relocate them. See Mark Maske, D.C. Group
Offers Padres $150 Million, but No Sale, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1993, at Fl. The pro-
posed sale failed much in part to the owners' ability to veto such moves as a direct
consequence of Baseball's antitrust exemption. Were Baseball to lose its exemption,
the sale might take effect, stripping the city of San Diego of its baseball team.
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B. Baseball Compares Favorably To Other Entities Exempt
From Antitrust Regulation
Since the passage of the Sherman Act, both Congress and the
judiciary have recognized the need to exempt certain industries
from antitrust scrutiny. Consequently, many industries operate as
monopolies and enjoy a large measure of exemption from antitrust
laws.188
Perhaps the most analogous illustration of the purposes served
by preserving Baseball's antitrust exemption appears in the agricul-
tural cooperative context. 9 Under the Clayton Act' 9° and the Cap-
per-Volstead Act,19' non-profit agricultural cooperatives do not
constitute illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
trade."~ These provisions allow farmers to act collectively in coop-
erative associations without subjecting these associations to the
strictures of antitrust laws.
These provisions were introduced to allow individual farmers,
through agricultural cooperatives acting as entities, the same com-
petitive advantage and responsibility available to businessman act-
ing through corporations as entities. 93 Consequently, farmer-pro-
ducers may organize together, set association policy, fix prices at
which their cooperative will sell their produce and otherwise oper-
ate like a business association without violating antitrust laws.
Similarly, Baseball's antitrust exemption enables it to act col-
lectively to provide affordable sports entertainment which serves a
vital public interest. Without the exemption, owners could freely
188. See Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (small businesses);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1937) (soft drink industry);
Michigan Citizens v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (newspapers); GVF
Cannery, Inc. v. California Tomato Growers Ass'n, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (agricultural cooperatives); Hawaiian Tuna Packers Ltd. v. International Long-
shoremen's Union, 72 F. Supp. 562 (D. Haw. 1947) (fishery associations).
189. See GVF Cannery, Inc. v. California Tomato Growers Ass'n, Inc., 511 F.
Supp. 711 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988).
191. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1988).
192. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458
(1960).
193. Id. at 466.
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move their franchises to more lucrative markets, 194 regardless of
whether the vacated community relies on the team as a source of
revenue. Thus, like the agricultural cooperative, Major League
Baseball requires the latitude to sustain a necessary and affordable
product independent of the strictures of antitrust laws.
C. Minor League Markets
Additionally, repeal of Baseball's antitrust exemption might
curtail the ability of millions of fans in smaller markets to watch
live professional baseball, the very concern that several legislators
articulated as the basis for the Senate subcommittee hearings.'9
Fans attending minor league baseball games pay as little as $2 to
see their team. 96 Removing the exemption might deprive 150
smaller communities of both the social and economic contributions
of minor league baseball"9 considering that immunity from antitrust
laws enables Major League Baseball to substantially subsidize mi-
nor league teams. 98 In this particular instance, repealing the ex-
emption would directly contravene Congress's alleged interest in
protecting the fans.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Federal Baseball has remained unaltered by the
Supreme Court for 71 years. The Court has refrained from action
in part, at least, because Baseball's exemption from antitrust laws
is not causing an unreasonable restraint of trade. Municipalities
and fans alike benefit from the fact that Baseball can regulate itself
and prevent franchise moves such as those which occur regularly
in the National Football League.
194. Although it is conceivable that Baseball could become subject to antitrust
laws with a stipulation that teams cannot freely move without League approval, the
effectiveness of such a scenario is questionable.
195. Stanley M. Brand, Do Not Repeal the Field of Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
1993, § 8 at 9.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Senate Committee Takes Swings at Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 63
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 743 (Dec. 17, 1992).
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It is an erroneous assumption that the public would benefit if
Baseball lost its exemption. Baseball's exemption from the
Sherman Act protects the cities that currently have teams. Al-
though the Reform Act proposed in Congress would grant cities
currently without teams, such as St. Petersburg, the benefit of the
antitrust remedies provided by the Sherman Act, San Francisco and
other cities of the American and National Leagues enjoy the bene-
fits of Baseball's antitrust exemption.
Instead of attempting to bring Baseball in line with other sports
by revoking or fatally narrowing its antitrust exemption, legislators
and jurists should recall the purpose of the exemption at its incep-
tion-to allow the unimpeded development of professional base-
ball-and preserve it to insure that Major League Baseball and its
subsidiary minor league franchises continue to provide entertain-
ment for dedicated fans and generate revenue for deserving com-
munities.
Y. Shukie Grossman
1993]

